Yesterday, I illustrated how Kaplan's argument in The Revenge of Geography reflects an ideological position that Ken Booth has described as the 'Cold War of the Mind'. Given all of its shortcomings, how can this ideological position find enough traction to be taken as credible, both within the academic community, but more importantly amongst policy-makers and the general public? Why does it have any resonance?
A partial answer is that Kaplan's argument is underpinned by several other more widespread political myths. I am using myth here in a way similar to that developed by Roland Barthes and later deployed by Cynthia Weber in her examination of the main theories of international relations. Thus, as Weber notes in International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction, a myth is not something that is necessarily false or based on fiction. Rather it is something that is accorded a level of status such that it is taken at face value and not questioned. In other words, a myth is an idea or assumption that is not subject to any analysis of its truth content; it appears to be true from first principles.
There are four key myths of note. The first important myth is one that claims states are the only legitimate forms of socio-political organization, in part because states will always protect their citizens and are the best organization to do so. The second is the sameness myth which is based on the assumption that social homogeneity brings safety and security. The third important myth is the difference myth which rests on the assertion that social heterogeneity necessarily leads to conflict and disorder. Therefore, people who are different should be seen as a threat. The final myth is actually a set of myths around what can be said to be natural as opposed to arising from specific socio-political dynamics and the inequalities these generate: poverty, conflict, and scarcity. If one questions any of these myths or demands that some evidence be provided for their assertions--perhaps they may be true but for different reasons than is claimed--than the entire argument in The Revenge of Geography begins to fall apart.
Yet, in general, these myths are not questioned because they have been so ingrained into our patterns and processes of thinking about the world and what might be politically possible. And what Kaplan's argument attempts to do and what the myths outlined above contribute to is the generation of fear.
The scenario that they produce is one where we perceive that there are people who are out to get us. And these people are completely unreasonable because they blame us for their own poor current state of affairs when we bear no responsibility--nor should we bear any responsibility--for them.
How then does this play out politically?
Solutions tend to revolve around building up enough power and the proper set of mechanisms to deter enemies and/or contain them in areas outside of a protected core. At the same time, there is also a concurrent move to expand this core by giving other groups of people who may have the capacity to convert--that is to become one of us--the opportunity to do so. Sometimes this may mean forcing them to convert against their will. In other cases where conversion is not an option and letting them in is considered to pose too big a risk, the 'pragmatic' or 'realist' response is to eliminate them through brute force or in some cases simply letting them die through neglect. These are precisely the kind of calculations that defined the Victorian thought that Kaplan believes will provide the solutions to contemporary global issues.
Thus, the heart of my critique of The Revenge of Geography is that I believe that the imperialist and, at the most extreme, even genocidal mentalities that Kaplan wishes to forward as pragmatism have no legitimate place in contemporary global politics.
The photo above taken by jot.punkt is called 'struggle' and is being displayed under the terms of a Creative Commons license.
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